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NOTES AND COMMENT
Perpetuities in Wisconsin: Will the rule be construed merely as
one against suspension of alienation or likewise against remoteness
of vesting?-The task of speculating whether or not the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin will be governed at all by the New York case of
Matter of Wilcox' is no easy one. Perhaps no other realm of Wis-
consin law is in a more chaotic condition at the present time than that
relating to the rule against perpetuities,-especially insofar as personal
property is concerned and in view of the recent amendment to the
Wisconsin statutes.2
Originally, section 230.14, Wisconsin statutes 1925,3 provided in effect
that any future estate that shall suspend the absolute power of alien-
ation beyond the statutory period4 shall be void; and that such power of
alienation was suspended when there were no persons in being by whom
an absolute fee in possession could be conveyed. As amended in 1925,
the added provision declares that limitations of future or contingent
interests in personal property are subject to the rules prescribed in
relation to future estates in real property.
Concisely, the query is whether or not this statute together with
section 230.155 repeals the entire common law rule or whether the court
can go further and declare that the statutes being in derogation of the
common law, and the rule against perpetuities not being in terms or by
necessary implication repealed, the common law rule against perpetuities
is still in force in Wisconsin.
Harking back to the origination of Wisconsin law, we find that sec-
tions 230.14 and 230.156 were enacted in x849. Resorting to the com-
mon law, the celebrated Duke of Norfolk's case7 (1682) stands out as
the first case where the rule against perpetuities was applied; there it
was decided (though mere dictum) that a contingent future limitation
which must necessarily vest within a period of lives in being was good.
But throughout the common law and up until 1882, remoteness of vest-
ing was confused with questions of alienability. However, Thellusson
v. Woodford,' decided in i8o5, appeared to cling to the suspension of
alienation rule insofar as the court held that no matter how many lives
were involved, so long as they were in being and capable of being ascer-
1 94 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497.
'Sec. 230. x4, Wis. Stats.
Formerly sec. 2038.
' Two lives in being at the creation of the estate and twenty-one years there-
after (sec. 230.15) subject to the exception of charitable devises and the exception
mentioned in sec. 23o.16.
Formerly sec. 2039.
'Then Ch. 56, secs. 14 and 15 and slightly modified since, but not in a manner to
affect the discussion here.
73 Ch. Gas. 1, 22 Eng. Reprint 931.
aii Ves. II2, 8 Rev. Rep. 104, 32 Eng. Reprint I030.
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tained, the vesting, of a conditional limitation might be postponed until
the termination of the life of the longest liver. The natural conclusion
would therefore be that the legislators enacted sections 230.14 and
230.15 with a view to the common law and as that was rather unsettled,
and though they themselves might have been more or less confused, they
settled any dispute and clearly intended that the law applicable in Wis-
consin should be against suspension of alienation only.
London & South Western Ry. Co. v. Gomm,9 decided in 1882, was the
first case in which this question was really specifically involved. There,
the English court declared without reservation that the rule against
perpetuities was one of remoteness of vesting and not of suspension of
alienation. In the meantime, however, both Wisconsin and New York
had enacted statutes governing the situation as to real property and as
interpreted by their respective courts, the rule was firmly established
that the rule of perpetuities was against suspension of alienation only.'0
But the paradox was then created by the New York court in Matter
of Wilcox, supra, decided in 1909. There, the New York court com-
pletely reversed its stand and declared that regardless of prior authori-
ties to the contrary, a limitation which created a remote future interest
by way of a conditional limitation, which interest, however, did not
render the property subject thereto inalienable, was void for remoteness.
Now then, the Wisconsin statutes, with one real exception\"l are in
almost perfect accord with those of New York and the question arises
as to the effect this New York decision will have on- the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin. Before this New York case was decided, there was no
question but that the law in Wisconsin was against the suspension of
alienation." This is true even though the rule was established through
what is known as more or less dictum. 13 In all of the Wisconsin de-
cisions, it might be argued that the decision of this specific point was not
essential to the dispositions of the respective cases. Nevertheless, it is
firm proof of the stand adopted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
02o Chant. Div. 562, 51 L. J. Ch. 30, 30 Wkly. Rep. 620.
"Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, gi N. W. 87; Robert v. Corning, 89 N. Y.
225; being the leading cases in the respective jurisdictions.
" Sec. 24 of the New York statutes, corresponding to sec. 230.23 of the Wiscon-
sin statutes, coincides insofar as the Wisconsin statute goes but has certain added
provisions not found in Wisconsin.
2 Becker v. Chester, supra. The rule was followed in In re Will of Kopmeier,
H3 Wis. 233, 89 N. W. 134, Danforth v. Oshkosh, I19 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258,
Williams v. Oconomowoc, 167 Wis. 281, 166 N. W. 322; then Becker v. Chester
was preceded, to the same effect, by Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N. W. 92,
De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 499, 21 N.W. 615, and Harrington v. Pier, 1O5 Wis.
495, 82 N. W. 345.
" In Becker v. Chester, the dictum that the common law rule against perpetu-
ities was not in force in Wisconsin, was dissented from by Chief Justice Cassoday
insofar as the inclusion of personal property was concerned. However, the Justice
appeared to realize that the remedy rested solely with the legislature when he said,
" . . . . in the hope that the legislature may do something to relieve the state
of Wisconsin from being the only state in the Union where personal property may
be given in trust for a private purpose and rendered inalienable for all time."
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not 'only during one instant personnel but throughout the history of
law in Wisconsin.
The'rule providing for the inclusion of personal property can in no
wise affect the situation, except possibly to urge the imperativeness of
a change to the rule against remoteness of vesting. Now, the rule
must either be against suspension of alienation as to both real and per-
sonal property, or against remoteness of vesting as to both. Both are
included in the same section of the statutes and logic alone suffices to
establish this conclusion.
Will of Smith, ' 4 decided in 1922, would seem to dispel any thought
of Wisconsin being influenced, at least immediately, by Matter of Wil-
co.r. Here the court, again inferentially, declared that the policy of the
state was against suspension of alienation only and supported itself by
the decisions noted previously.
However, even supreme courts are not endowed with the aura of in-
fallibility. The New York court reversed itself (but as to real and
personal property alike) and as the better reasoning seems to lie with
Justice Cassoday's dissent in Becker v. Chester, supra, it would not be
surprising to see the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reverse its stand
when the proper case is presented. The amendment to section 230.14
which included personal property in the "perpetuity" statute should
act more or less as a wedge in presenting the opposite view for the
court's perusal. However, in the absence of additional legislation, it
seems that whatever stand is taken, the rule will have to be applied
both to real and to personal property alike.
J. O'B.
Criminal Law: Remarks of District Attorney in final plea as preju-
dicial error.-In the instant case1 the defendant, a barber in the city
of Superior, was indicted for taking indecent liberties with little girls
lured into his shop by promises of candy and small amounts of money.
The district attorney in final argument to the jury made two statements
which are the basis for this appeal to the Supreme Court: "The de-
fendant is sending little girls down the primrose path to hell, oustide
of the indecent liberties involved in this case"; and "Defendant's counsel
has said that there was another way of handling this case, and I say the
only other way was to kill him."
The Supreme Court in its review of the case speaks of the general
rule as follows:
Considerable latitude must be permitted in oral argument, and much is left to
the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether an improper statement was
made under such circumstances that it might be excused, mitigated, or even jus-
tified.
However in this case, the remarks as quoted were held to be preju-
dicial error, notwithstanding the fact that the trial judge directed the
jury to disregard them. In Justice Stevens' opinion we find:
The district attorney represents the commonwealth, a commonwealth which
seeks justice only. It is as much the duty of the district attorney to see that no
" 76 Wis. 494, 186 N. W. 18o.
'O'Neil v. State, 207 N. W. (Wis.) 280.
